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Vladimir Putin President or Authoritarian Ruler? 
 
On December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin handed the Russian presidency over 
to Vladimir Putin. Along with the presidency, Putin received Yeltsin’s vision for a 
democratic country. However, instead of following the road to democracy that 
Yeltsin had paved, Putin began to diverge from Yeltsin’s course and take Russia 
in a new direction towards authoritarianism. Putin has accomplished the 
consolidation of power through state ownership of the media, state involvement 
in the oil industry, and an extension of executive power. Putin has distinguished 
himself as an authoritarian ruler of Russia not the president. 
Upon first glance of Russia’s government, it is clear why Putin has been 
labeled a president. The western definition of a president is a popularly elected 
head of state who is confined to a term limit and whose power is limited through 
a system of checks and balances.1 Putin exemplifies this definition because he 
was popularly elected in each of his three elections, and the existence of a 
multiparty system in Russia still exists today. For example, in the 2012 
presidential election, five parties were represented: United Russia, Just Russia, 
Communist Party of Russia, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and an 
Independent Party. A multiparty system provides political competition and helps 
1 Merriam Webster, November 30, 2013, accessed November 30, 2013, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/president. 
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deter the domination of a single party. In addition to political open mindedness, 
freedom of the press is widely promoted throughout Russia. Putin even allows 
criticism of himself to be published on his own website. Freedom of the press is 
one of the fundamental liberties for a free democratic society. Another key 
aspect for a free society is a free market economy. While Russia is not a 
completely free market economy, it is largely privatized. For instance, the 
prevailing industry in the Russian economy is oil and 57% of the oil industry is 
privately owned.2 If an economy is restricted, it establishes a situation where 
civic freedom is substantially constrained. While these instances lead one to 
believe Russia is a free democratically governed country, it is merely how it 
appears on the surface. Upon closer examination, one can see the crippling 
effects of Putin’s authoritarian regime on opposing political parties, other 
branches of the Russian government, the freedom of the press, and the Russian 
economy.  
In order to understand why Putin can be classified as an authoritarian one 
must define an authoritarian. An authoritarian can be defined as a leader who 
has absolute control over a country or state through consolidation of power by 
limiting civic freedom.3 Putin has accomplished this through diluting the power 
2 Daniel Treisman, The Return: Russia's Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (New York: 
Free Press, 2012),  340-385. 
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of the Duma and Federal Council, while extending the influence of the executive 
branch. In 2001, Vladimir Putin founded the political party United Russia. This is 
significant because United Russia has become the most dominant political party 
in the Duma. The Duma election results illustrated the supremacy of United 
Russia; in the 2003 Duma election United Russia captured 38% of the seats, 
2007 64% of the seats, and in 2011 49% of the seats. United Russia’s control of 
the Duma, allows a pro Putin agenda to be promoted and this nullify the Duma’s 
ability to preserve a democratic government.4 In addition to the Duma, the 
Federal Council is the second governing body that makes up the legislative 
branch in Russia. Originally, the Federal Council was composed of democratically 
elected governors who ruled over the different regions of Russia. Putin reformed 
the Federal Council by dividing Russia into seven federal districts, governed by 
seven officials chosen by Putin.5 Putin’s ability to pick and chose elected officials 
in the Federal Council is not a characteristic of a free society and renders this 
legislative body ineffective. Furthermore, Putin is able to control the judicial 
branch because under the stipulations of the Russian Constitution the president 
is able to choose Supreme Court judges as well as the federal prosecutor.6  In the 
1993 Russian Constitution, Boris Yeltsin gave the executive branch more power 
4 “Russian Federation Gossoudarstvennaya Duma (State Duma).” INTER-PARLIAMENTARY 
UNION. March 27, 2014. Accessed March 27, 2014. 
http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2263_E.htm. 
5 “Putin’s Reforms.” Seminar Russia. March 26, 2014. Accessed March 15, 2014. 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/seminar.497.2010.russia/putin_s_reforms. 
6 “Chapter 4. the President of the Russian Federation.” The Constitution of the Russian 
Federation. March 15, 2014. Accessed March 15, 2014. 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm. 
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than both the legislative and judicial branch, however a system of checks and 
balances akin to the US Constitution was included as well. The legislative branch 
was supposed to represent checks on executive power. However, Putin has 
abolished the system of checks and balances through his significant influence 
over the legislative and judicial branches. By weakening the power and influence 
of the legislative branch Putin has been able to extend the power of the executive 
branch. 
Putin also exhibited authoritarian qualities when he discovered a 
loophole in the Russian Constitution. The Russian constitution stipulates that a 
president may only serve two consecutive terms. Putin had to give up the 
presidency in 2008, upon completion of his second consecutive terms. In order 
to maintain a firm grasp on the Russian government, he reached a deal with 
Dmitry Medvedev. Putin had agreed to support Medvedev in exchange for being 
named prime minister of Russia. It is very common for an authoritarian to refuse 
surrendering his power. Many people saw Medvedev as nothing more than a 
“puppet” for Putin. This has been substantiated because under Medvedev from 
2008-2012, more legislation was passed to extend the power of the executive 
branch in Russia. For example, in 2008, the presidential term was extended from 
four to six years. More evidence to support Medvedev’s puppet status was his 
voluntary withdrawal from the presidency in 2012 after only one term. The only 
logical reason for Medvedev’s short stint as president was to act as a “stand in” 
for Putin, so after four years he could run for reelection and not violate the terms 
 5 
of the constitution by serving three consecutive terms as president. Putin’s 
appointment of Medvedev as the prime minister of Russia after his reelection in 
2012, also confirms Medvedev’s role in Putin’s scheme to take advantage of a 
loophole in the Russian constitution. With the extension of the presidential term 
limit in 2008, Putin stands to be in office until 2024.7 Thus Putin has the ability 
to have significant influence and power in Russia for a span of 24 years. In a 
democratic society, leaders do not find loopholes in the system to hold onto 
power, but they relinquish power after their term limit has expired in order to 
preserve the existence of a democracy. Putin’s lengthy clutch of power proves 
that he is not interested in preserving democracy; his primary concern is 
retaining command of Russia. 8 
Putin has sought to expand his influence over other institutions as well. 
Freedom of the press allegedly exists in Russia today. However, one may ask how 
freedom of the press can exist when the three major television channels in 
Russia are owned by the state? The three major television channels in Russia are 
Rossiya, Channel 1, and NTV. The state owns Channel 1, and Gazprom, and a 
state run oil company, owns both Rossiya and NTV. This is significant, because 
the majority of Russians rely on the television for their news. If the state owns 
the news networks, then they can manipulate and control all information that is 
7 Mike Sefanov, “Russian Presidential Term Extended to 6 Years,” CNN Europe, December 
22, 2008, accessed November 30, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/12/30/russia.presidential.term.extension/. 
8 Christian Neef and Mathias Schepp, “The Puppet President: Medvedev's Betrayal of 
Russian Democracy,” INTERNATIONAL, October 4, 2011, accessed November 30, 2013, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-puppet-president-medvedev-s-betrayal-
of-russian-democracy-a-789767.html. 
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presented to the people of Russia. Not only can the government control what 
news is disseminated to the people, it can censor opposing political parties as 
well. In order to receive votes and support, political parties must advertise 
though television, the primary news medium for the Russian people. If certain 
political parties do not receive airtime, they will be prevented from running a 
successful campaign. The state regulation of television is a method used to 
eliminate opposing political parties without having to ban them from 
participation in government. Control of the media, specifically television in 
Russia, is an effective means for Putin to silence his opponents and promote his 
pro Putin agenda.9 
Putin has been able to successfully regulate Russia’s quasi-free market 
economy by cornering the oil market. In his book The Return, Daniel Treisman 
accurately describes Russia as a “petrocracy”. Treisman argues that only around 
37-43% of the oil industry is state owned, and that oil is fundamentally 
privatized. Treisman is correct is his assertion; however, the companies that the 
state owns determine the market power of the oil industry.10 The major state-
run oil companies are Gazprom, Transneft, and Rosneft. The state owns 
Gazprom, the largest extractor of natural gas in Russia, and the state has a 
monopoly on Rosneft, an oil and natural gas refinery, and Transneft, an oil and 
natural gas pipeline in Russia. Despite the oil industry being largely privatized, 
9 Luke Harding, “Russian Tv Channels Come under State Control,” Rense, October 17, 2009, 
accessed November 30, 2013, http://rense.com/general88/russz.htm. 
10 Treisman, 362-367,  
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the state controls the vital sources of production, refinement, and distribution of 
all of the oil and natural gas in Russia. This is significant, because Russia’s 
primary industry is its production and exportation of oil and natural gas.11 If the 
state controls the oil, then the state controls the economy at large. Russia’s total 
GDP is $2.555 trillion dollars and $5.92 billion dollars make up its total revenue 
from exports. The oil and natural gas industry account for 75% of all Russian 
exports.12 As a result the state ownership of these resources allows domination 
of the market, because it has the ability to determine all of the production and 
distribution of oil and natural gas. Putin’s control over the oil industry signifies 
that he in charge of the Russian economy. Putin’s firm hold on the Russian 
economy drastically reduces the ability of the Russian people to pursue their 
own economic goals, significantly reducing civil liberties in Russia and extending 
executive power. 
Putin also shows his authoritarian tendencies by quashing any serious 
political opposition. For example, in 2000, when Putin came to power, he gave 
the oligarchs an ultimatum. The oligarchs would be allowed to keep their money 
provided that they did not involve themselves in politics. The oligarchs had 
amassed vast fortunes under Boris Yeltsin and came to hold many influential 
positions in many prominent industries in Russia, but Putin refused to allow 
11 Leon Aron, “The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas,” American Enterprise Institute, 
May 29, 2013, accessed November 30, 2013, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-
defense-policy/regional/europe/the-political-economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/. 
12 “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, November 13, 2013, accessed 
November 30, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rs.html. 
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them influence in his government. For instance, Mikhail Khordorkovsky made 
his wealth through the oil company Yukos. Yukos was one of the premiere 
petroleum companies in Russia until the company went bankrupt, and all of its 
assets were sold. Mikhail Khordorkovsy’s critical comments of Putin led to the 
company’s downfall. He did not heed Putin’s warning and openly argued with 
him about corruption in the Putin government in 2003. In the same year, he was 
charged with tax evasion, and as a result, Yukos filed for bankruptcy.13 In order 
to recover from its tax liability, Yukos was sold at auction to Rosneft, a state run 
refining company. Not only was Putin able to silence a political opponent in 
Khordorkovsky, he was able to sell one of the largest privately owned oil 
companies in Russia to the state-run company Rosneft.14 As a result, Putin was 
able to accumulate more state ownership of the oil industry and increase his 
control over the Russian economy. In addition to Khordorkovsky, Boris 
Berezhovsky also felt the wrath of Putin. Berezhovsky made billions through his 
ownership of Channel 1 in Russia. However, like Khordokovsky, Berezhovsky 
was critical of Putin and his policies. In 2000, Berezhovsky was exiled to Britain 
and all of his Russian assets were seized. Even the mighty industrial 
heavyweights like the oligarchs, with their tremendous wealth and economic 
influence, could not undermine Putin and his extended executive power. Putin’s 
13 “Mikhail Khordorkovsky,” The Moscow Times, November 30, 2013, accessed November 
30, 2013, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mt_profile/mikhail_khodorkovsky/433772.html. 
14 Peter Finn, “Putin: Sale of Yukos Unit Legal,” The Washington Post, December 22, 2004, 
accessed November 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16512-
2004Dec21.html. 
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authority has become unwavering, and anyone who attempts to undermine it 
will be crushed. 15 Putin has remarkable power, so much so that the oligarchs in 
Russia have become subservient to him. 
In addition to the oligarchs, there has been a similar response to 
journalists who are critical of Putin. For example, journalists Yuri 
Shckekochikhun and Anna Politkovskaya, were highly critical of Putin up until 
their mysterious deaths. Yuri Shckekochikhun was an advocate against the FSB, 
Russia’s security agency, claiming that they were responsible for the Moscow 
apartment bombings in 1999 and the mismanagement of the Moscow Theater 
crisis in 2002. Putin felt the impact of Yuri Shckekochikhun’s journalism, because 
Putin was in command of the FSB. In 2003, Shckekochikhun died from a 
“mysterious illness”; however many speculated that he was poisoned in order to 
stop his anti-Putin journalism. 16  Similarly to Shckekochikhun, Anna 
Politkovskaya was a published author and journalist who strongly opposed 
Vladimir Putin. She discussed how Putin had created an authoritarian regime 
and had limited political freedoms in Russia. In 2006, Politkovskaya was found 
shot to death in her apartment building. Even though there was no direct 
evidence attributing both of these deaths to Vladimir Putin, it raised several 





16 “Prosecutors Say Novaya Gazeta Journalist’s Mysterious Death Was Not Murder,” 
Reporters Without Borders, April 10, 2009, accessed November 30, 2013, 
http://en.rsf.org/prosecutors-say-novaya-gazeta-10-04-2009,30806.html. 
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questions and concerns. 17 The fact that two journalists, who were critical of the 
head of state, were killed leads one to believe that they were quieted in order to 
prevent any further anti Putin literature. Journalists were not the only people 
subject to “suspicious” deaths. In 2006, an ex KGB officer, Andre Litvenenko 
succumbed to poisoning in a London hospital.18 Litvenenko was an outspoken 
critic of both Putin and the FSB. Polonium was used to poison Litvenenko and 
silence his opposition of Putin. It is significant because Litvenenko was living in 
London at the time of his death. This shows anti-Putin voices can be silenced 
even if they do not live within the confines of Russia.19 The deaths of forthright 
anti Putin Russians indicate that while “freedom of the press” is believed to exist 
in Russia, there maybe serious consequences for speaking out against Putin and 
the Russian government.  
Putin is an illusionist, because on the surface, Russia appears to be a 
democratically governed country with protected civil liberties. However, 
Russia’s multi party system, largely privatized economy, and freedom of the 
press are nothing more than a façade. Putin has successfully extended executive 
power by stripping the Duma of a portion of its power through changing its 
electoral processes.  He has also discovered loopholes in the Russian constitution 
that have permitted him to evade the constitutional term limits for the 
17 “Anna Politkovskaya, 1958-2006,” The New York Times, June 26, 2009, accessed 
November 30, 2013, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/anna_politkovskaya/. 
18 Yemane, Yonas. “Alexander Litvinenko's Poisoning.” March 15, 2011. Accessed November 
30, 2013. http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2011/ph241/yemane2/. 
19 Treisman, 102-113.  
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presidency. In a country were the president is able to circumvent the 
constitution and restrict the power of other legislative bodies, one has to ponder 
if freedom truly exists? Putin has accumulated enough power to control almost 
every facet of the lives of the Russian people. Putin is in control of the 
government, the media, and the economy the three primary socio economic 
institutions in Russia. Furthermore, any anti-Putin discourse will not be 
tolerated and one has seen how outspoken Russian people have been jailed, 
exiled, or killed. When a person has to question their safety when criticizing the 
president or wonder whether or not the news they receive is reputable, the 
assumption is that there is a dearth of freedom in that country. Vladimir Putin 
has become the most powerful person in Russia and has successfully restricted 
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